The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 were a human tragedy of great proportions. The fact that about 3,000 innocent people died raises serious moral and ethical questions about this offensive. These attacks on the main political, economic and military symbols of American power also had great significance for global security, including the security of African and Asian peoples. Over 20 African and Asian countries lost their citizens in the 11 September attack: Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Thus, in terms of citizens lost, Africa and Asia were substantially hit by these terrorist attacks.
The subsequent US bombing of Afghanistan from October 2001 with a view to destroying the Taliban and al-Qaida structures also caused thousands of deaths of innocent Afghans and raised important questions about addressing security threats from non-state actors that are not concentrated in one location. In addition, this predominantly military-centred approach to terrorism had considerable significance for international law, democracy, human rights and other international norms and institutions. The US described the terrorist offensive as a threat to democracy and civilised values. This description carried extra weight because those who masterminded the assaults were Muslims who had a grudge against the US government. Not surprisingly, some Muslim groups viewed the American reprisals against the Taliban and al-Qaida as a war on Islam. The events of 11 September 2001, and the massive US military response, highlight the problem of demonising the ‘other’ that happens to have different values, institutions, norms and beliefs. Hence the difficulties associated with loaded questions such as ‘why do they hate us?’ and ‘can we kill them before they kill us?’

The ‘us’ had no definite meaning, but it sometimes signified the US and the West vis-à-vis the rest of the world. At other times, the word ‘us’ was used in a way that signified the whole world, excluding the Taliban supporters and the terrorists. By the end of 2001, the US was increasingly acting unilaterally, claiming that it did not want to be constrained by international norms, institutions and regimes. Despite this streak of unilateralism, the US approach to terrorism appears to have become the standard for the rest of the world. These developments suggest a need for more reflection on how the ‘war on terror’ is likely to impact on international norms and institutions and especially their effects in Africa and Asia.

The principal aim of this article is to examine the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on international norms and institutions and their practices in Asia and Africa. It argues that the phenomenon of terrorism, and the way it has been interpreted, has had a double negative effect on global norms and institutions.
in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. In the first instance, terrorism and especially the events of 11 September 2001 have been a major threat to universally accepted norms and institutions. In the second instance, the events of 11 September 2001 have been used by the US, major Western states as well as some African and Asian states as an excuse to subtly undermine international rules, norms and institutions, including human rights, democracy and the laws of war.

A point worthy of note is that there are different, even conflicting, interpretations of global norms and institutions. There is also no clinical definition of terrorism. Hence, this article seeks to answer the following questions. What are international norms and institutions? What is terrorism? What is the significance of 11 September 2001 for the operation of international norms and institutions in Africa and Asia? The next section explains international norms and institutions. It is followed by a discussion of terrorism. The third section examines the problems posed by the events of 11 September 2001 and the US response to international norms and institutions. The fourth explores options for tackling terrorism through one of the global norms, namely development. The conclusion suggests that it is by re-emphasising the rules, norms and institutions that Africa and Asia, and indeed international society as a whole, can contain terrorism.

Understanding Norms and Institutions

There are no universally accepted definitions of norms and institutions. Peter Katzenstein has defined norms as ‘collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity’.² For purposes of this article, this definition will be expanded so that norms are understood as historically contingent understandings about appropriate behaviour and practices that are shared by global actors.³ Although norms are shared understandings, it is the interests and preferences of hegemonic states that determine their shape. In this sense, African and Asian states and peoples are consumers rather than shapers of global norms. However, once established, norms are expected to constrain
the behaviour of the strong and the weak alike. As international actors interact, they generate new norms, but the actors and their practices are products of older norms.

Robert Keohane suggests that institutions ‘can be identified as related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time’. He argues that institutions must possess certain characteristics, namely ‘persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles’. Hedley Bull defines institutions as ‘a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’. He sees institutions as ‘an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions – and at the same a means of sustaining this collaboration’. These institutions include the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and ‘the managerial system of the great powers’. John Mearsheimer defines institutions as ‘a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate or compete with each other.’ He argues that institutions ‘prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior’. He goes on: ‘These rules are typically formalized in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets’.

The above definitions use the term institution in two senses. In the first, an institution is a stable set of rules, principles and norms. In this case, state sovereignty, diplomacy, international law and multilateralism are institutions. For purposes of this essay, these are primary institutions. In the second sense, an institution is a formal organization or a regime. Multilateral organizations that meet this definition include the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Mearsheimer’s definition of institution is limited to such organizations. Bull excludes such organizations in his definition, saying that by institution he does
'not imply an organization or administrative machinery'. I will call these *secondary* institutions.

There is a relationship between primary and secondary institutions: primary institutions underpin secondary institutions. For example, the UN, a secondary institution, is intelligible because it is based on multilateralism, a primary institution. John Ruggie defines multilateralism as ‘an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of “generalized” principles of conduct’. He claims that these principles ‘specify appropriate conduct for classes of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence’. The important point about the relationship between primary and secondary institutions is that international actors attach meaning and significance to international organizations only because they are familiar with the primary institutions on which these organizations are constructed.

This article is interested in how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted on the operation of primary, rather than secondary, institutions in Africa and Asia. Such primary institutions include human rights, democracy and state sovereignty. Before explaining the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on global norms and institutions, it is necessary to define terrorism.

**Explaining Terrorism**

For a long time, the term terrorism has been used and abused by policy makers and analysts alike. Those who seek to delegitimate the tactics and strategies of their opponents often describe them as terrorist acts. Hence the aphorism that one person’s freedom fighter is another person’s terrorist. Despite, or because of, the horrific nature of the events of 11 September 2001, neither the US nor any of its partners in the ‘war on terror’ has come up with a clear definition of the term terrorism. This section addresses the following
questions. What is terrorism? What effect have the events of 11 September 2001 had on the understanding of terrorism?

Like the meanings of many phenomena that have a history, the definition of terrorism cannot be fixed in time or geographical location. It is historically contingent and may be based on grievances that are primarily political, religious, social, cultural, economic, environmental or any combinations of these and other factors. However, for purposes of this article, terrorism in the present era can be defined as an activity that consists of at least four distinct elements. The first is the arbitrary use of violence, including bombings and assassinations. The second is the attempt to intimidate a people, society, state or government, so that it can give in to the terrorists’ demands. The third is the violation of international norms, rules and institutions. This may come in the form of aircraft hijacking, the kidnapping of political leaders or embassy staff and similar activities. The fourth is the deliberate targeting of non-combatants as was the case in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001.

This characterisation of terrorism implies that states as well as non-state actors have the potential to perpetrate terrorism. States may sponsor terrorism by providing money, logistical support, training, weapons and safe passage to the terrorists. Indeed, many states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, the US, and the former Soviet Union have at various times been accused of supporting organizations that engaged in terrorist acts. For example, during the Cold War the US supported UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi in Angola, with the then US president Ronald Reagan describing Savimbi as the moral equal of the founders of the USA. At that time, most African states were united in the belief that UNITA was a terrorist organization. The Soviet Union also aided various anti-Western organizations, including several Palestinian factions associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Some terrorist acts are easy to identify. For example, many people accept that the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 were terrorist. Other terrorist actions may not be so easy to identify, and for this reason some governments have labelled legitimate opposition groups terrorists. In Zimbabwe, for example, President Robert Mugabe has branded his opponents terrorists while the country’s security forces have unleashed violence on those suspected to be opposition supporters. In the Middle East, Israeli government officials have labelled the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat a terrorist, while Palestinian Authority officials complain of the terror inflicted on Palestinians by Israeli forces. On the Indian subcontinent, the Indian government justifiably describes many Kashmir separatists as terrorists while Pakistani officials regard them as liberation fighters. In Afghanistan, opponents of the Hamid Karzai government have been described as Taliban or al-Qaida terrorists, when some of them might have nothing to do with these organisations. The assault on the al-Qaida network and its protectors may be considered a ‘war on terror’, but not everyone who considers himself or herself a member of the Taliban is necessarily a terrorist. Moreover, some organizations may consist of several wings that employ completely different modes of operation. For example, al-Qaida had a complex network of associated organizations, some of which performed legitimate functions such as the provision of relief assistance. If African and Asian governments continue to use the term terrorism as a metaphor for delegitimating the actions of their opponents, their tactics will eventually stifle legitimate opposition activities, undermine universally accepted norms and institutions, and foster the type of desperation that leads to the commission of terrorist acts.

One immediate impact of the events of 11 September 2001 has been to militarise the responses to terrorism. While it has been generally acknowledged that fighting terrorism, at both national and international level, is the responsibility of law enforcement agents, the US and its anti-terrorism coalition partners, including some African and Asian states, have defined their strategies
in military terms. Sri Lanka and the Philippines are examples of countries that militarised their anti-terrorism strategies long before the 11 September attacks. Policy makers may believe that a military onslaught is the most effective weapon against terrorism. However, given the fact that one of the goals of terrorism is psychological victory, a resort to military means rather than law enforcement gives the terrorists a psychological boost. It gives terrorists great satisfaction to know that they have forced the target state to rethink its strategy, inconvenience its citizens and re-arrange its political, economic and social priorities. The militarisation of anti-terrorism strategies is a psychological victory for the terrorists.

Terrorism can present enormous challenges to the integrity of African and Asian states, but it is susceptible to the processes of global governance. To the extent that terrorism violates universally accepted rules, norms and institutions, it undermines the platform on which global governance is constructed. Its use of violence may destabilise some states and compel them to resort to military means to try to contain it. However, the most effective response to acts of terror is not to resort to a military response, but to enhance the universally accepted rules, norms and institutions. It is through these norms and institutions that order, security and justice may be realized in the Asian and African states that are susceptible to terrorist attacks.

A global anti-terrorism strategy ideally belongs to the UN. Since the 1960s, the UN has deliberated on terrorism and adopted 12 conventions on it between 1963 and 1999. The UN has condemned and sought to prohibit acts of terror, but at no time has it offered a clear definition of terrorism. One reason is that during the Cold War many states could not agree on what to include or exclude from the definition. To some Western countries, the organizations and individuals labelled as terrorists included Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress, but to African states these were legitimate freedom fighters. Other ‘notorious’ terrorists included Xanana Gusimao of East Timor. The second reason why the UN mechanism did not come up with a definition was
that there was no motivation for the great powers to act in concert to tackle terrorism at the global level. During the Cold War the superpowers always sponsored terrorist groups against their rivals or their rival’s allies. The third reason why a definition of terrorism was not provided within the UN deliberations was that many states were reluctant to consider outlawing terrorism unless concrete measures were taken to address its root causes. This implied that some states regarded some acts of terrorism, like those carried out by Palestinian groups, as justifiable responses to particular grievances. Thus, ideological differences, national interest considerations and failure to address the root causes of discontent prevented the UN from providing a working definition of terrorism.

However, towards the end of the 1990s, the UN General Assembly, through resolution 54/110 of 9 December 1999, came close to providing a definition of terrorism. It stated: ‘Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be used to justify them’. This was an indication that, given the right atmosphere and support, the UN was moving towards a framework through which it would handle terrorist acts like those committed on 11 September 2001.

**11 September 2001, Norms and Institutions**

The events of 11 September 2001 exemplify how global transformations have changed the nature of security threats. One of the unique features of this assault against the most powerful country in the world, is that it was undertaken by ‘freelance’ individuals, not other states. Secondly, the attackers did not use firearms, bombs, missiles or any sophisticated weaponry; they were armed with kitchen knives and other simple non-lethal implements. Thirdly, the attack, which aimed at the main symbols of US financial, military and
political power, was launched from within the US itself, not from outside. Fourthly, some of the hijackers had been trained in US civilian and military facilities. This terrorist offensive has become a pivot around which scholars and policy makers have postulated about a ‘paradigm shift’. Whether these events constitute a ‘paradigm shift’ is an open question. However, subsequent actions by the US and several African and Asian countries, including India, Pakistan and the Philippines, suggest that international norms and institutions are under threat. The actions, which these countries have undertaken, have had a strong bearing on multilateralism, norms, institutions and democratic rule in Africa, Asia and globally.

**Sidelining Multilateralism?**

As African and Asian states have few resources to deploy in pursuit of their international goals, multilateral forums are their most effective vehicles. Multilateralism gives Africa and Asia the influence and voice that they would not have in bilateral negotiations with the great powers. Therefore, for African and Asian states and peoples, the UN provides an important opportunity to express their independence and solidarity.

The UN also happens to be the most important and the only universal multilateral organization. Its main purpose, as stated in Article 1(1) of the UN Charter, is to ‘maintain international peace and security’. To pursue this purpose, the UN is required ‘to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes’. Thus the UN has a mandate to deal with all kinds of threats to peace and security, including terrorism. Moreover, many of the norms and rules that have shaped global governance since the 1940s have been arrived at through the UN. It was not surprising, therefore, that on 12 September 2001, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368 strongly
condemning terrorist actions against the US. Two weeks later, on 28 September 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution 1373, which provided an unlimited mandate to use force to prevent terrorist acts. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1373, inter alia, requires all states to ‘take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts’.

The US government could have used the UN resolutions in its war against Afghanistan, but it chose not to. ‘Operation Endure Freedom’, which commenced on 7 October 2001, was conducted outside the UN framework, with the US claiming the right of self-defence. This was partly to avoid involving the Security Council in managing the war. While some people have claimed that it was necessary for the US to cut through an ineffective multilateral discussion to assert its leadership on the ‘war on terror’, there was no justification for it because there was unanimous support within the Security Council for immediate and speedy action against terrorism. Given this situation, it can be concluded that the US decided not to use the UN machinery to prosecute the war in Afghanistan because it preferred unilateralism to multilateralism.

The terrorism issue has highlighted American unilateralism very clearly, but the contribution of terrorism to US unilateralism should not be overemphasised. Early in 2001, the US took various unilateral actions on global issues, ranging from the environment to arms control. Indeed, a keen reading of US foreign policy since World War II shows that it has always been characterised by swings between unilateralism and multilateralism. For example, in the 1980s the US treated the UN with considerable disdain. However, during the Cold War American unilateralism had only limited effect on the overall performance of the UN and on multilateralism because of the bipolar nature of international politics. In this post-Cold War era, US unilateralism has more impact on the international roles of African and Asian countries because the US is the world’s only superpower. Enhanced unilateralism basically leads to greater dependence by African and Asian
countries and peoples on the US. Thus, one unfortunate effect of the events of 11 September 2001 is that Africa and Asia will find their independence in global politics diminished.

Discarding other norms and institutions?

International norms, rules and institutions may have been determined by the great powers, but they have had an important role in constraining African and Asian governments for the benefit their people. Without norms and institutions, there would be no sense of order, security and justice in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Even the ‘war on terror’ is intelligible only because international society has constructed rules and norms. If the most powerful state does not want to be constrained by international norms and institutions, these institutions can be seriously undermined. According to Hedley Bull, a great power is not merely one ‘in the front rank in military strength’. He claims that the ‘duties that are expected of a great power include that of taking account of the interests and views of other states in formulating their own policies, and the responsibility of defining its interests widely enough to encompass the preservation of an international system in which the bulk of member states regard themselves as having a stake’. Bull believes that great powers forfeit their claim ‘to be regarded by others as responsible managers of the affairs of international society as a whole’ when they act selfishly. By making clear that it does not want to be constrained by international institutions and norms, the US is undermining its claim to be regarded by other states as the world leader. It also indirectly threatens certainty, stability and order in Africa, Asia and international society as a whole because its actions might encourage aspiring great powers to emulate it. Moreover, by showing scant regard for international norms and institutions, it indirectly provides justification for terrorist organizations.

With regard to the so-called war on terror, the norms and rules that might have been violated are those contained in the laws of war. These
include the rules relating to the legality of resorting to force (*jus ad bellum*) and those relating to the conduct of war (*jus in bello*). As Adam Roberts states: ‘The body of international law applicable in armed conflict does appear to have a bearing on many issues raised in anti-terrorist military operations in Afghanistan as well as elsewhere’. Three issues are of particular importance with regard to the ‘war on terror’: the legality of resorting to force; the proportionate application of force; and the treatment of captured combatants.

In discussing the legality of force, it is often tempting to refer to the just war doctrine. This doctrine has two main components: ‘first, that war must be a “last resort” and, second, that its anticipated costs to soldiers and civilians alike must not be disproportionate to (greater than) the value of its ends’. The claim that war is the last resort can be interpreted in several ways. First, it means that those inclined to use force must explore other means of resolving the dispute prior to starting war. Second, it implies that the use of force should be seen as the least preferred option in a conflict. What this ultimately means is that force should be used only if a serious evaluation of other options suggests that they have no likelihood of delivering the anticipated outcome.

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks and subsequent American claims that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida network were behind the tragedy, the Taliban regime indicated that it was willing to discuss the surrender of bin Laden to a neutral Muslim venue for trial. Probably they had in mind something similar to the Lockerbie incident, where two Libyans, accused of planting a bomb on an aircraft that crashed near the town of Lockerbie in Scotland in December 1988, were tried in a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. The fact that the Taliban offer was not explored would suggest that force was not used as the last resort. Rather than resort to war within less than a month after the terrorist action, the US could have explored other options, including sanctions and the use of an international criminal tribunal and other judicial mechanisms. In other words, the legality of force against Afghanistan is not clear-cut.
Another component of the just war theory concerns the means by which war is waged and especially the degree of force to be applied. The conduct of military force is likely to have a decisive impact on the perceived legitimacy of a military operation. Whether force is legal or not, its use is expected to be discriminate and proportionate, not excessive. This suggests that great care has to be taken to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. It is very difficult to know how many innocent people have been killed by US and ‘allied’ forces in Afghanistan, but press reports suggest that between 3,000 and 10,000 civilians might have been killed. Some have argued that because the terrorists killed many innocent people in the US, the American government should not be constrained by the fear that innocent Afghans might die ‘as part of collateral damage’. One major difference between governments and terrorists is that governments are parties to the Geneva Conventions while terrorists are not. Therefore, states have a responsibility, and are expected, to adhere to the laws of war. Indeed, states not only violate international norms but also undermine global governance once they start emulating the tactics of the terrorists.

A third convention that might have been violated concerns the treatment of those captured in war. Two cases in particular illustrate the difficulty the US had with the treatment of Taliban and al-Qaida fighters: the capture of Taliban and al-Qaida fighters near Mazar-i-Sharif in late November 2001; and the detainees in Quantanamo Bay. It was claimed that captured Taliban and al-Qaida fighters who had been held at Qala-i-Jhangi near Mazar-i-Sharif revolted in late November 2001. This revolt was not contained until the US bombed the compound, killing hundreds of people. This raised questions about the disproportionate use of force, arrangements for handling prisoners, and what influence, if any, the US had over Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, which had sided with the US. Following the subduing of the Taliban and al-Qaida forces, the US took many of their captured fighters to its military base at Quantanamo Bay. To the extent that these fighters were party to the conflict, whether they belonged to organised armed forces or militias, they were lawful
combatants in the ‘war on terror’. Lawful combatants are entitled to the PoW status under the Geneva Conventions, but the US government undermined these conventions by treating the Taliban and al-Qaida detainees at Guantanamo Bay as if they had no human rights. The US government eventually decided to treat non-Afghan al-Qaida fighters as ‘illegal combatants’ while treating the Taliban fighters as PoWs under the Geneva Conventions. The US attempt to undermine the Geneva Conventions provides great comfort to African and Asian dictators who are also inclined to violate the laws of war.

**Undermining human rights and democracy?**

Writing in the late 1970s, Paul Wilkinson argued that the ‘primary objective of counter-terrorist strategy must be the protection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law’. He went on to say that ‘this aim over-rides in importance even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence’. However, since 11 September 2001, the US and other countries, including India, Pakistan and the Philippines, have adopted internal security measures that diminish individual liberties and weaken democratic processes. These measures also give the terrorists the impression that they have been successful in their efforts to intimidate the states in question. If the aim of the terrorists was to compel governments to inconvenience their citizens and reduce individual liberties, they succeeded. To the extent that human rights are a part of international rules and norms, the internal security measures adopted by various states in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks undermine the basis of global governance.

The human rights that many people take for granted are a product of long struggles between civil society and governments. This contest is continuing, and it has been common for governments, Western and non-Western, to use real or perceived external threats to impose restrictions on people’s freedoms. The attempt to restrict freedoms is one of the strategies that the states use to try to reassert their authority in both domestic and
international affairs. The 1989 ‘Beijing massacre’ was an example of the continuing contest between the people and authority, one battle in the struggle for human rights.  

Human rights exist side by side with democracy. The decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was characterised by efforts to spread a particular model of democracy to African and Asian countries and other states that had overthrown communism. It is partly for this reason that Thomas Franck claims that human rights and democracy have become ‘a normative rule of the international system’. He posits that democracy ‘is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes’. However, this appears to have changed since 11 September 2001. Some of the countries that had been isolated by the international community for undermining democracy, have been embraced as allies in the ‘war on terror’. For example, Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, took power in a military coup, toppling a popularly elected but corrupt government, in October 1999 and was isolated by the international community. However, the ‘war on terror’ in 2001 brought him to centre stage. In January 2002, Musharraf announced a decision to crack down on militant Islamic groups and close down some Islamic schools. He also organised a referendum in 2002, which gave him a five-year extension to his rule. Most critics saw the referendum as a ploy to be used to legitimise his rule. The losers in this process are the Pakistani people, norms and institution, and, in the long-term, the ‘war on terror’.

While organising a coalition against Iraq in 1990, the then US president, George W. Bush (senior), talked of a new world ‘where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice’. However, in organising a coalition against terror in 2001, the US President, George W. Bush (junior), said: ‘Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’. He made no distinction between democratic and
anti-democratic regimes. What counted was their allegiance to the US in its ‘war on terror’. If George Bush senior sought to increase American global influence by appealing to the norms, rules and institutions of international society, George Bush junior has sought to assert US global influence by chipping away universally accepted norms and institutions. Being with the US president around Easter 2002 meant saying nothing about the escalating violence in the Middle East, a development that was bound to lead to more, rather than less, terrorist actions.

Addressing Terrorism Through Development

The events of 11 September 2001 call for imaginative and creative strategies to enhance global norms and institutions and to reduce the likelihood of terror. Writing in a US professional military journal in late 2001, Admiral Dennis Blair said that in the Asia-Pacific region the US and its coalition partners could ‘carry out the campaign against terrorism with tools other than military force: diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, economics, business, information, media, academia, community leadership and religion’. This was before the US committed troops to fight guerrillas in the Philippines. Admiral Blair’s argument implies that there are several options for addressing terrorism, and one of those most appropriate for African and Asian states is development.

Since the 1940s, development has been regarded as a global norm and it is intrinsically related to global governance. The aim of development is to improve the quality of life – in economic, political, cultural and social terms – without diminishing the quality of life for future generations. The aim of global governance is to provide order, security and certainty in international affairs by establishing formal and informal mechanisms through which states, NGOs, intergovernmental organisations and MNCs jointly address world problems. In the 1990s, the UN organised several conferences which, according to former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, were designed to shape ‘a consensus around certain essential development values’. They included the
1992 Rio summit on the environment and development; the 1993 Vienna conference on human rights; the 1994 Cairo conference on population and development; the 1995 Copenhagen summit on social development; the 1995 Beijing summit on women’s rights; and the 1996 Istanbul conference on human settlements. These conferences were development-focused, but they were also a part of global governance. Development and global governance stem from a common set of values, norms, beliefs, ideas and institutions. International activities such as electoral assistance, peacekeeping, human rights monitoring and the management of refugees, are a part of development. But they are also an integral part of global governance.

Development has the potential to reduce the chances of terrorism by eliminating the roots of discontent in Africa and Asia. As World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, says: ‘The international community has already acted strongly, by confronting terrorism directly and increasing security. But those actions by themselves are not enough. We will not create that better and safer world with bombs or brigades alone’.

He goes on: ‘We must recognize that while there is social injustice on a global scale – both between states and within them; while the fight against poverty is barely begun in too many parts of the world; while the link between progress in development and progress toward peace is not recognized - we may win a battle against terror but we will not conclude a war that will yield enduring peace’.

Given the fact that those who masterminded the attacks of 11 September 2001 were from middle-class families, some people may dismiss the claim that poverty and disadvantage are causes of such actions. Part of the answer to such sceptics may be drawn from Wolfensohn who says ‘Poverty is our greatest long-term challenge ... poverty which, while it does not necessarily lead to violence ... can provide a breeding ground for the ideas and actions of those who promote conflict and terror’. People, like those who masterminded the events of 11 September 2001, do not have to come from poverty-stricken homes, in order to identify with the poor. These people might have been rich, but they
defined their identities in terms of the aspirations of the downtrodden. Development includes capacity building in its broadest sense, thereby implying the promotion of new ideas, standards, institutions, norms and techniques of overcoming obstacles to human progress. It includes democratisation, enlightened leadership, an independent judiciary, and responsible and accountable governments. It can also help people redefine their identities. These aspects of development play a crucial role in reducing the chances of terrorism. It is through development that Asian and African countries and peoples can address terrorism without eroding the universally accepted norms and institutions.

Conclusion

Terrorism is a threat to global norms and institutions. The way the US, African and Asian countries, and other major international actors, have responded to the events of 11 September 2001 have also threatened global norms and institutions. It is through a universal organization like the UN that an effective antidote may be found to most of the acts of terrorism. So far the UN has not provided an appropriate mechanism for the ‘war on terror’ largely because its member states have not agreed on one. Using the UN to tackle terrorism is likely to enhance global governance and move the world farther from the terrorists. Therefore, it is the responsibility of states in Africa, Asia and elsewhere to seek a solution to terrorism through multilateral efforts, particularly within the UN framework. It is mainly by renewing and reemphasising the norms, rules and institutions that African and Asian countries, and international society as a whole, can most effectively address terrorism.

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Endnotes:


5 Keohane, 'International Institutions', p. 384.


10 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', p. 8


For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Roberts, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War’.


For an assessment of the security situation in Southwest Asia following the bombing of Afghanistan, see M. Ayoob, ‘Southwest Asia After the Taliban’, *Survival*, 44,1 (2002).


Wolfensohn, ‘A partnership for development and peace’.

Wolfensohn, ‘A partnership for development and peace’.